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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE
CHESTER G. VERnR AND ELmER A. Wncox.
BAIL.
Ford v. Dilley, Ia., 156 N. W. 513. Presumption of guilt from indictment.
By a divided court, it was held that the lower court erred in refusing bail
to one indicted for murder in the first degree, such refusal having been based
on the fact of the indictment, alone.
Under common law procedure the minutes of the grand jury were not
available for any purpose, and indictment of a capital offense raised a presumption of guilt necessary to overcome the right to demand bail. An order
of commitment or finding of a coroner's jury or ruling on preliminary hearing were subject to review and the evidence admitted of a summary revision, and
such findings or order were of no effect on the hearing of an application for
bail. People v. Tinder, 19 Cal. 539.
In the United States the names of witnesses for the prosecution are usually
on the indictment and these may be called on the application for bail. The
minutes of the grand jury may be examined by a court on application for
bail. And in spite of these facts the American courts quite generally have
held that an indictment for a capital offense is conclusive against the right
to demand bail, while findings on preliminary examinations have been consistently held of no evidential weight in the determination of the right. Hight v.
United States, 1 Morris, 407, State v. Jenkins, 129 La. 1019, In re Thomas, 20
Okla. 167, Cowell v. Patterson, 49 La. 516. In such cases the American courts
seem to lose sight of the reason for the English rule in cases of indictment.
They also seem to lose sight of the fact that a grand jury proceeding is ex
parte, that life and liberty are synonymous in America, that one is presumed
innocent until proven gifilty, and that there is no reason for resorting to a
fiction-that the presumption falls because of the indictment and later revives
at the trial of the accused. They lose sight of the fact that the burden of
proof of guilt is on the state, that grand juries have no authority to find
degrees of offense, that the prosecuting attorney has practically full control
of the grand jury proceedings, and that the indictment is found in the highest degree as a matter of form. They lose sight of the fact that evidence
to support an indictment is not necessarily such as to make the proof evident
or the presumption great. Lynch v. People, 38 Ill. 497
Statutes allowing bail to all persons before conviction, except for capital
offence, where the proof is evident or the presumption great, make bail the
rule, and the logical rule is that the state must show that the proof is evident
to bring the case into the exception. Re Haigler 15 Ariz. 153, State ex rel.
Murray v. D. Court of the 2nd Jud. D., 35 Mont. 504, Ex parte Bramer, 37
Tex. 2, ex parte Newman, 41 S. W. 629, ex parte Finlen, 20 Neb. 141. The
defendant should be presumed innocent until proven guilty in any case. State.
v. Kauffman, 20 S. D. 620.
The reason for the English rule in case of indictment was because of
secrecy in grand jury proceedings. Chitty's Crim. L. 128-129.
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Since the indictment is of no weight on the final trial of the accused, and
since by the better rule in America the evidence given before a grand jury
can only be used for impeachment purposes, an indictment should not even
be considered in the question of right to demand bail. The prisoner should
be entitled to make his first appeal for bail to the discretion of the Court
by presenting circumstances and facts from which the Court may find him
entitled to bail. In re Losasso, 15 Colo. 163, Ex pare McAnnally, 53 Ala. 495,
People v. Tinder, 19 Cal. 539.
Some states now say that after an indictment for a capital offense the
burden of proof is on the accused on the application for bail. In re Thomas, 2')
Okla. 167, In re Froley, 3 Okla. Crim. 719, Ex Parte Alexander, 59 Mo. 598.
Some states have amended constitutions to expressly allow bail after indictment for capital offense. Ex parte Ezell, 40 Tex. 451. Such an amendment seems surplusage however, in view of the wording "before conviction."
The case of Hight v. U. S., 1 Morris 407, has been cited in one-half of the
states and still represents the rule in many.
The Iowa Court in Ford v. Dilley in overruling Hight v. U. S., say that it
represented the law before the constitution was framed and statutes enacted to
the effect that an indictment should be open to the examination of the courts.
The Iowa courts in Ford v. Dilley, in fact, did overrule Hight v. U. S., since
at the time of that case, the ordinance of 1787 carried identical provisions. And
in spite of the dissent in Ford v. Dilley this case represents a logical rule; one
toward which the courts of America seem to be tending through- the aid of
definite legislation or in spite of historical reasons which clearly do not apply
to the present criminal procedure of America.
A. H. BOLTON, Iowa City.
BURDEN OF Pnoo'.

Dietzel v. State, Tenn., 177 S. W. 47. Unexplained suspicious circunistances.
It is an axiom of the criminal law that the state must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime with which he is charged.
When the evidence is wholly circumstantial it is often said that it must not only
be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis; that it is not enough to rouse suspicion, and that the defendant need not explain suspicious circumstances until the state has made
out a prina fade case against him. The familiar presumption of guilt arising
from the unexplained possession of stolen property, soon after the theft, is
accounted for as being an exception to the general rule that the defendant need
not explain suspicious circumstances. Such a rule in favor of the defendant
was proper as an offset to a system which allowed him neither counsel nor the
power to compel the attendance of witnesses. It does not seem necessary
under modem conditions, and is often overlooked, perhaps unconsciously. It
is seldom however that a conviction is so completely supported upon the failure
to explain suspicious facts as in this case. The evidence showed that George
Wehman was a painter, about 55 years of age. He was eccentric, miserly,
and it was known that he usually carried considerable sums of money upon
his person. He had separated from his wife and boarded in Union City. Only
two persons in the city were known to be intimately associated with him. On
Saturday, July 11, 1914, he returned to his boarding house from his work at
about 8 o'clock, washed, counted his money, which was in two tobacco sacks,
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silver in one and bills in the other, paid his board, and about 9 o'clock walked
to the business part of the town with the man at whose house he boarded.
They separated, agreeing to meet at 10:30 and go home. Wehman took a
bath, leaving about 10, and about 10:20 was seen standing on the street, three
blocks from his boarding place, as though waiting for some one. He was not
seen again alive, but on July 24 his body was found in a well a little more than
three miles from the place where he was last seen. A gunshot wound in the
back of his head had caused his death. Several articles that he probably had
with him, including the sack of silver money, were also found in the well,
but the sack of bills was missing.
Dietzel was charged with the crime. He was a young man about 21 years
of age, the son of a man of considerable means. He had sought Wehman's
company, and a few days before the murder had driven with him to a neighboring town, where they had supper together. On the night of the 11th, Dietzel
went down town and hired a horse and open buggy about 9 or 9:30 He was
seen on the street, apparently without the horse and buggy, several times
between 9 and 10. One witness saw him talking to a man he thought was
Wehman. He was seen near his father's house at about 10:15. This was
on a street parallel with that on which Wehman was last seen alive, and two
blocks from that street. His father, mother, sister, and a young man who
was calling on his sister, testified that he came home about 10:30 and went to
his room. At 11:30 the horse Dietzel had hired earlier in the evening was returned to the stable by some one who left it in front of the stable and immediately went away without being seen. The horse Was hot and excited.
That night a witness saw a man who was closely wrapped in a lap robe,
so that he could not be identified, driving toward the city along a road leading from-the well in which the body was found. The next morning a bloody
lap robe was found at the stable, that was pretty clearly proved to have been
in the buggy let to Dietzel, though there was a possibility that it had been in
another buggy, but there was evidence that it could not have gotten bloody
in the other buggy. The well in which the body was found was one of
three near a lane which ran between two roads. Dietzel was seen in that lane
on the morning of July 12, at dusk July 13, and again about 11 or 12 o'clock
that night, on the evening of the 15th, and two or three other times before the
body was found. He was alone and there was no apparent reason why he
should be there. July 12 Dietzel paid his club dues, which were six months in
arrears, amounting to $12. On the same day he paid his sister $15 on account
of a debt he owed her and two or three days later paid $8 to a tailor, giving
him a ten dollar bill. A few days later the tailor made 'a bank deposit of $55
which included a ten dollar bill that he thought was the one received from
Dietzel. This bill had a red stain, was worn on one edge, and was torn in the
upper right hand corner. A few days before he disappeared, Wehman had paid
out a ten dollar bill, stained red from the red tobacco pouch in which he carried his bills, which was worn and torn like the one deposited by the tailor, so
that apparently both had been carried in the same roll and worn and torn at
the same time. A ten dollar bill, part of the money with which Dietzel paid
his club dues, was also stained red, but there was proof that red stains
were common on paper money in that locality. A few days after the murder
a man was sent to search the wells. He took Dietzel, who was familiar with
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that section, to show -him where the wells were. Four were searched, three
of which Dietzel pointed out, but though they went through the lane near which
the body was subsequently found, Dietzel did not show him either of the three
wells there.
Dietzel was convicted. In considering the sufficiency of the evidence, the
supreme court disposed of the alibi by pointing out that the defendant's life
was at stake, and that the testimony was destroyed by the proof that the buggy
was not returned till 11:30, and the failure to show that the defendant turned
the buggy over to anyone else. As a motive, there was the evidence that the
defendant was short of money, as shown by his club dues being in arrears. It
was asked why he sought the company of this eccentric laborer and drove him
about the country; why he hired the rig, what he did with it, and how the
lap robe became saturated with blood. Who else was on such terms with
Wehman that he would have taken a midnight drive with them? Why was the
defendant paying his debts on Sunday after the murder? Where did he get the
money? Where could the bills, so stained, worn and torn have come from
except from Wehman's red tobacco sack? Why did not the defendant point
out the wells along the lane? Why was he there repeatedly after the murder?
As the defendant had explained none of these circumstances, the conviction was
affirmed, but "since there is here, as in every case of circumstantial evidence,
a possibility (a bare possibility in this case) of mistake, we prefer to heed the
expression of the jury and commute this sentence to life imprisonment." As
thus modified the conviction was affirmed.
E. A. Wn.cox, Iowa City.
CARRIERS.

U. S. v. Union Mfg. Co., 36 Sup. Ct. Reptr. 429. "Obtaining" transportation at less than the established rates.
A consignee is none the less guilty of fraudulently obtaining interstate transportation at less than the established rates, contrary to the prohibition- of the
act of Feb. 4, 1887 (Comp. St., 1913, sec. 8574) where he falsely and fraudulently understates the weight of the shipment, with the effect of influencing the adjustment of the freight, because the transportation -had been completed and the
shipment delivered to him before the fraudulent representations were made.
CONSPIRACY.

U. S. v. Bopp et al. 230 Fed. 723. Indictment.
Criminal Code (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 10201) makes it an offense to conspire to commit an offense against the United States. Sec. 13, (Comp. Stat.
1913, sec. 10177) makes it an offense for any person within the territory or
jurisdiction of the United States to begin or set on foot or provide or prepare the means of any military expedition or enterprise to be carried on from
thence against the territory or dominions of any foreign prince with whom
the United States are at peace. An indictment charged that defendants conspired to begin and set on foot and provide and prepare the means for certain
military enterprises to be carried on against the territory of the king of Great
Britain, and alleged that such enterprises were to be carried on against the
Dominion of Canada and certain British steamships, and that it was the intention of the defendants to blow up, damage, and destroy certain railroad tun-nels, railroads, bridges, trains, and ships engaged in transporting munitions of
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war to England, France, Russia and Japan. Held, that the indictment was
insufficient, as the charge that defendants conspired to set on foot or provide
means for a military enterprise were mere conclusion, and it did not charge
a conspiracy to do ;any acts which would constitute a setting on foot of a
military enterprise or a providing of means therefore, nor was it aided by the
allegations as to defendants' intention, since an attempt to destroy such tunnels,
etc., was not necessarily a military enterprise, especially as it was not even
alleged that the purpose of such destruction was to prevent the transportation of
munitions of war.
C. G. Vaas ni, Palo Alto.
FALSE PERSONATION.
Lamar v. U. S., 36 Sup. Ct. Reptr. 535. Of Federal "offlcer."
A member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United
States is an officer acting under the authority of the United States, within the
meaning of U. S. Crim. Code, sec. 32 (Comp. Stat. 1913), making criminal the
false personation of such an officer with intent to defraud.
FALSE PRETENSES.

People v. Brady. Ill.
112 N. E. 126. Confidence game: elements of indictment.
Cr. Code (Hurd's Rev. St. 1913, c. 38), sec. 99, providing that in every
indictment for obtaining money or property by means of the confidence game
it shall be deemed a sufficient description of the offense to charge that accused
did, on, etc., unlawfully and feloneously obtain from a named person his money
or property by means and by use of the confidence game, does not violate
Const. art. 13, sec. 9, giving the accused -the right to demand the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. The indictment need not set out the acts
constituting the offense. Cartwright, Dunn and Cooke, JJ., dissenting.
FoRmER JEOPARDY.

Morgan, Warden, v. Sylvester: 231 Fed. 886. Identity of offenses.
It is not double "jeopardy" to convict and punish one, who broke into a
post office and stole stamps therefrom, for larceny, under Penal Code (Comp.
Stat. 1913, sec. 10214), though the larceny was in a sense a continuation of the
breaking and entering.
INDICTMENT.

U. S. v. Schwartz et al. 230 Fed. 537. Fraudulent use of mails: sufficiency
of indictment.
An indictment for using the mails in furtherance of a scheme to defraud
alleged that the scheme consisted of inducing persons to buy lots by false
representations concerning the locality in which the lots were situated, and by
falsely representing that the lots were worth from $150 to $200, and that a
number of lots were to be given away to leading rfiembers of various communities; the only expense to them being the sum of $19.50 to cover the cost
of a deed. It did not allege that the lost were valueless, and neither the real
value -or the proposed selling price was stated. Held, that the indictment was
insufficient, as failing to show a real purpose to defraud purchasers out of their
money, as a purchaser of a lot worth more than he pays for it is not defrauded,
though it is worth less than its represented value.
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INTOXICATING LQUORS.

People v. Brown. Ill. 112 N. E. 462. Local option: temporary suspension
and effect as to prior offense.
One charged with a violation of Local Option Law (Laws 1907, p. 297)
and with previous conviction under the same act cannot plead, regarding former
conviction, that during a period between that conviction and the alleged offense
the-law was not in force in that territory, since the vote did not repeal the law,
and, if it did, such a repeal would not be a remission under Rev. Stat. 1874,
c. 131, sec. 4, providing that no law shall be so construed to repeal a former
one as to an offense committed or penalty or punishment incurred under the
former law.
MANSLAUGHTER.

Commonwealth v. Webb, Pa. 97 AtI. 189. Provocation.
An attack by a woman, five feet seven inches in height and weighing from
200 to 250 pounds, upon her husband, six feet in height and weighing 165 pounds,
with a poker fifteen inches in length and one-quarter of an inch in diameter, is
not such provocation as to create the irritation and passion necessary in a reasonable being to reduce homicide to manslaughter.
PosT OrrICE.
U. S. v. Lophansky. 232 Fed. 297. Statute: construction.
Act March 4, 1909 c. 321 (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 10364) making it an
offense to extract from or out of a letter box or authorized depository mail
matter which has been deposited therein, does not apply to the act of taking
mail matter which has been placed on and outside the box.
McShann v. United States. 231 Fed. 922. Tampering with the mail: "letter intended to be conveyed by mail".
Decoy letters addressed to fictitous persons, which were placed in the
mails by post office inspectors, so as to be carried over the route of a suspected
railway-mail clerk, and intended to be removed from the mails at the end of
his route without being carried to the place of address are letters intended to
be conveyed by mail, within Penal Code (Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 10365), making it punishable for an employee in the postal service to detain, delay, or
open any "letter intended to be conveyed by mail".
SELF DEFENsE.

State v. DiMaria. N. J. 97 Alt. 248. Duty to retreat.
A person upon whom an assault is made so violent in its character as
to endanger his life or to threaten him with serious bodily injury, is not
justified or excusable in standing his ground and killing his assailant if he
can avoid the impending danger by retreating.
SENTENCE.

Walsh v. Commonwealth, Mass. 112 N. E. 486. Discharge in upper court
for error in sentence.
Under Rev. Laws, c. 193, sec. 12, providing that if a final judgment is
reversed by reason of error in the sentence, such judgment shall be rendered
in the case as the court below should have rendered, or it may be remanded
to said court for that purpose, the Supreme Court has power to discharge
the prisoner, judgment being reversed for error in the sentence, if justice
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requires it, as where one convicted of a first offense in taking claims within
prohibited bounds has paid an excessive fine after imprisonment for twelve
days, though defendant will escape without a record of conviction of crime.
WEAPONS.
State v. Menge, Dela. 97 Alt. 588. Concealed weapons-Defenses.
Under the act of the Gen. Assembly of March 14, 1911 (26 Del. Laws c.
275), which substantially re-enacted act of Gen. Assembly April 8, 1881 (16 Del.
Laws, c, 548), making it a crime for any person to carry concealed upon or about
his person a deadly weapon other than an ordinary pocket knife, and imposes a more stringent penalty, allows peace officers to search any person suspected of carrying a deadly weapon, but provides for obtaining permission from
the court, it is no defense to a prosecution for carrying concealed a revolver
that accused was carrying same for the lawful purpose of returning it to
his home: it having been borrowed and returned to him while he was on the
street.

